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in Environmental Technology?
Abstract
In the context of the EPA’s 33/50 program, we study whether a VPR can prompt 
firms to develop new environmental technologies that yield future emission reduction 
benefits.    Because  pollutant  reductions  generally  require  costly  reformulations  of 
products and/or production  processes, environmental over-compliance – induced by a 
VPR  –  may  potentially  spur  environmental  innovation  that  can  reduce  these  costs.  
Conversely,  a  VPR  may  induce  a  participating  firm  to  divert  resources  from 
environmental research to environmental monitoring and compliance activities that yield 
short-term benefits in reduced emissions. We find evidence that higher rates of 33/50 
program  participation  are  associated  with  significant  reductions  in  the  number  of 
successful environmental patent applications four to six years after the program ended; 
these results suggest a negative relationship between the 33/50 program and longer-run 
environmental innovation. 
Keywords: Voluntary environmental programs, regulatory enforcement, environmental 
innovation, count panel models
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I. Introduction
Voluntary  pollution  reduction  programs  have  become  an  integral  part  of  U.S. 
environmental policy; there are currently over 60 partnership programs sponsored by the 
Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA).  Participants  in  these  programs  commit 
themselves to reduce pollutant emissions that are not addressed by environmental laws, 
or exceed emission standards set forth by such laws when they exist. Current partnership 
programs include ``AgStar" which promotes the use of biogas recovery systems to curb
Methane emissions at confined animal feedlot operations  and ``EnergyStar" which seeks 
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Economists have put forth a number of theories to 
explain why profit-maximizing firms self-select into costly voluntary pollution reduction 
programs (VPRs). Empirical work has sought to determine the extent to which these 
theories have operated in practice to explain actual participation, most notably in the 
EPA’s 33/50 program (e.g., see Arora and Cason,  1995, 1996; Videras and Alberini, 
2000;  Khanna  and  Damon,  1999;  Sam  and  Innes,  2006).    Empirical  work  has  also 
documented the salutary effect of VPRs in reducing pollution (e.g., Khanna and Damon, 
1999; Sam and Innes, 2004).  However, to our knowledge, there has been no work to date 
identifying the mechanism by which VPRs may lead to emissions reductions, whether 
due  to  heightened  management  awareness  and  conscientiousness  within  given 
environmental  systems  and  technologies  or  due  to  adoption  of  new  environmental 
management systems (Anton, et al., 2004; Khanna, et al., 2005) or due to adoption of 
new environmental technologies.
In this paper, we study this last potential channel for beneficial effects of VPRs.  
In particular, VPRs could induce participant firms to innovate in their environmental 
technologies, thus lowering their costs of over-compliance. Pollutant reductions generally 
require costly reformulation of products or production processes, suggesting that over-
compliance positively impacts environmental innovation. A limited number of theoretical 
(Milliman and Prince (1989), Fischer, and al. (2003)) and empirical (Jaffe and Palmer 
(1997), Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), Carrion-Flores and Innes (2006)) papers study 
the impacts of various environmental policy instruments  on technological innovation. 
While  this  work  generally  documents  that  higher  pollutant  abatement  costs  spur 4
environmental R&D (the induced innovation hypothesis), none has explored the potential 
role of VPRs in promoting innovation.
We present an empirical study of the determinants of environmental innovation 
using a panel of 127 U.S. manufacturing industries defined by 3-digit SIC classifications 
over the 1989-2002 period.  Following Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) and Carrion-
Flores  and  Innes  (2006),  we  measure  innovation  by  the  number  of  successful 
environmental  patent  applications.    The  VPR  that  is  our  focus  is  the  EPA's  33/50 
program, the principal object of empirical work on VPRs to date. The 33/50 program was 
created in 1991 as the EPA's first formal effort to achieve voluntary pollution reductions 
by regulated firms.  The program sought to reduce releases of seventeen toxic chemicals 
by a third by 1992 and by 50 percent by 1995, measured from 1988 baseline levels.   At 
its  inception,  the  program  invited  all  firms  releasing  33/50  pollutants  in  1988  to 
participate (approximately  5000 companies).  Although the 33/50  program  was purely 
voluntary  and  its  pollution  reduction  targets  were  not  enforceable,  there  is  ample 
anecdotal (EPA, 1999) and empirical evidence of the program's success.  We measure 
33/50 effects at a 3-digit SIC industry level using rates of industry participation in the 
program.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly 
describe the 33/50 program, followed by a description of competing empirical hypothesis 
that we test in this paper. In section IV, we describe our empirical model, followed by 
discussion of our data and econometric methods in section V. Section VI presents our 
estimation results.  Finally, section VII concludes.
II.  The 33/50 Program 
Started in 1991, the 33/50 program was the EPA's first formal effort to achieve 
voluntary pollution reductions by regulated firms.  The program sought to reduce releases 
of seventeen toxic chemicals by a third by 1992 and by 50 percent by 1995, measured 
from 1988 baseline levels.  Roughly seventy percent of the 33/50 chemicals (by 1988 
weight of releases) were air pollutants (AC).  Two of the chemicals (carbon tetrachloride 5
and 1,1,1-trichloroethane) depleted the stratospheric ozone layer and, hence, came under 
the Montreal Protocol's provisions for the phase-out of such substances; however, these 
two chemicals represented less than fifteen percent of total 33/50 releases (in 1988).  
The EPA initiated the 33/50 program shortly after creating the Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI), a database compiling information on toxic releases of all firms with ten 
or more employees producing one or more of 320 targeted pollutants.  In early 1991, the 
EPA invited the 509 companies emitting the largest volume of 33/50 pollutants to 
participate in the program; these companies were responsible for over three-quarters of 
total 33/50 releases as of 1988.  In July 1991, the 4534 other companies with reported 
33/50 releases in 1988 were asked to participate as well.  With additional enrollments 
through 1995, the EPA invited a total of 10,167 firms to join the 33/50 program, and 
1294 firms accepted.  The latter program participants accounted for 58.8 percent of 33/50 
releases in 1990.  
The 33/50 program was purely voluntary and its pollution reduction targets were 
not enforceable.  Despite the absence of apparent regulatory teeth, the EPA (1999) cites 
some aggregate statistics as indicators of the program's success.  Among reporting firms, 
total 33/50 releases declined by over 52 percent between 1990 and 1996, and net 33/50 
releases, excluding the two ozone-depleting compounds, declined by over 45 percent.  In 
contrast, non-33/50 TRI releases fell by 25.3 percent over this period.  Moreover, rates of 
33/50 release reductions were greater for program participants (down 59.3 percent 
between 1990 and 1996) than for non-participants (down 42.9 percent over the same 
interval).  Of course, these numbers may mask other hidden determinants of firms' 
pollution; for example, participating firms may have been more apt to reduce pollution, 
regardless of participation in the 33/50 program.  However, recent work finds that, even 
controlling for other relevant explanators of pollution and potential selection bias in 
33/50 program participation, the program led to significant reductions in participant 6
emissions during the later program years of 1993-1995 (Sam and Innes, 2006; Khanna 
and Damon, 1999).  
The question posed in this paper is whether these short-term emission reduction 
benefits of the 33/50 program spurred or impeded environmental research.
III. Empirical Hypotheses
To  the  extent  that  firms  take  seriously  any  voluntary  pollutant  reduction 
commitments that they make (as is suggested by extant empirical evidence on the 33/50 
program), such commitments may implicitly elevate the potential cost-reduction benefits 
of new environmental technologies, thus spurring more environmental R&D:
Hypothesis 1.  Higher rates of participation in the 33/50 program yield increased 
incentives for environmental R&D and, hence, more environmental patents.
Hypothesis 1 is essentially the “induced innovation” hypothesis as it applies to VPRs.
However, this logic may not reflect the true nature of the dynamic trade-offs that 
confront firms.  For example, firms may have to decide how many resources to invest, 
alternately, in (i) environmental monitoring and compliance efforts that reduce short-run 
emissions, and (ii) research that may potentially yield new environmental compliance 
technologies.  In principle, a VPR might spur a diversion of resources from the latter 
(R&D) to the former (monitoring and compliance).  If so, we would instead have the 
competing hypothesis:
Hypothesis  2.    Higher  rates  of  participation  in  the  33/50  program  yield  a 
redirection  of  resources  away  from  environmental  R&D  and,  hence,  fewer 
environmental patents.
IV. The Empirical Model
Following  Carrion-Flores  and  Innes  (2006),  we  posit  an  underlying  structural 
model  that  determines  environmental  patent  outcomes  as  a  function  of  anticipated 
emission standards, 33/50 participation rates, and other observable exogenous variables. 
This model takes the following simple form:
(1) Pit = a
*
pit  + b
*
p Et-1(Qit) + c
*
p Qit-1 + d
*
p PR it-1 + f
*
p X pit + ε
*
pit7
where Pit is time t environmental patents in industry i, Qit  is time t emissions in industry 
i,  Et-1(Qit) is its time t-1 expectation, PRit-1 is the appropriately lagged measure of the 
33/50  participation  rate  in  industry  i,  the  Xpit  represent  exogenous  variables,  and  eit
represent random errors.  This structure gives rise to three types of joint endogeneity: (1) 
the observable regressor, Qit, is jointly endogenous in the usual sense, with technological 
change potentially prompting revisions in emission standards; (2) the true regressor, Et-
1(Qit), is measured with error; and (3) there is potential selection correlation between 
33/50  participation  rates  and  innovation  because  more  innovative  industries  (ceteris 
paribus) may be more likely  to  participate in  the VPR.   Under perfect foresight, the 
second “endogeneity” problem evaporates and all we need are instruments that are highly 
correlated with emissions and 33/50 participation, but uncorrelated with patents.  Without 
perfect  foresight,  but  with  rational  expectations,  we  also  need  such  identifying 
instruments, while also requiring that all instruments be lagged (see Carrion-Flores and 
Innes, 2005).   In this paper, we estimate under  both premises.  We use enforcement 
variables  to  jointly  identify  the  two  jointly  endogenous  variables  (emissions  and 
participation), as there is ample evidence that strict enforcement in the form of more 
inspections and enforcement actions, spurs emission reductions (Gray and, Deily 1996; 
LaPlante and Rilstone, 1995) and 33/50 participation (Sam and Innes, 2004), but has no 
discernable  effect  on  innovation  (Carrion-Flores  and  Innes,  2005;  Brunnermeier  and 
Cohen, 2003).  Standard instrument and over-identifying restriction tests (Bound, et al., 
1995;  Wooldridge,  2002)  provide  statistical  evidence  in  support  of  these  instrument 
choices.
In estimating (1), there a number of determinants of innovative activity for which 
we need to control, in addition to the evident role of anticipated emissions and the key 
33/50 participation effects of interest.  First, spillovers in research activity may lead to 
environmental  patent  successes;  we  use  non-environmental  patent  counts  and  overall 
industry R&D investments to control for these effects.  Second – and unlike prior work –
we seek to measure potential impacts of environmental pressure groups on environmental 
R&D.  We do so by including an industry measure of Sierra Club strength.  Third, we 
control for industry size using a measure of real sales.  Fourth, we control for the nature 
of industry assets, both age and capital intensity.  We expect industries with older assets 8
and  more  capital  intensive  production  to  have  more  scope  for  cost-reducing 
environmental R&D.  Fifth, more rapidly growing industries may have either more or 
less incentive to innovate, whether because they have already modernized and hence have 
less scope for innovation or because they are more innovative by nature and hence more 
likely  to  innovate  in  the  environmental  realm  as  well.    Finally,  more  concentrated 
industries  may  be  prone  to  either  more  or  less  environmental  R&D.    On  one  hand, 
concentration gives rise to “raising rivals costs” motives for heightened research (Innes 
and Bial, 2002); on the other, concentrated industries may collectively recognize the costs 
of higher R&D in spurring tightened environmental regulations, leading to a research 
deterrent (Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2005).  We control for such effects by including a 
measure of industry concentration in our estimations.
V. Data and Empirical Estimation
Our sample is an unbalanced panel of 127 manufacturing industries defined by 3-
digit SIC classifications (SIC codes 200-399) over the period 1989 – 2002.  Total toxic 
emissions data are available from the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) for 1989-
2002.
4  Using the TRI, we construct industry level total toxic releases (TRI-REL) by 
aggregated weight by year.  Facility releases reported in the TRI are assigned to the 
primary industry of the parent company.  Using data on 33/50 chemical releases obtained 
under a Freedom of Information Act request from the EPA, we also construct total 33/50 
chemical releases (33/50-REL) by industry by year.  
Following  previous  studies  (c.f.,  Jaffe  and  Palmer,  1997;  Brunnermeier  and 
Cohen,  2003  and  Carrion-Flores  and  Innes,  2006),  we  use  successful  environmental 
patent applications as a proxy for environmental innovation. Using data from the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, we construct successful patent application counts by year, 
by  industry,  environmental  and  non-environmental,  obtained  by  U.S.  companies. 
Environmental patents are determined by patent classifications that relate to air or water 
pollution,  hazardous waste  prevention,  disposal  and  control, recycling  and alternative 
energy  (ENV-PAT).  Non-environmental  patents  are  those  in  all  other  patent  utility 
classes (NONENV-PAT).
                                                
4 Because the first year of TRI release reports are considered incomplete and suspect, we only rely on post-
1988 TRI data.9
The EPA’s Office of Environmental Information Records provided data on 33/50 
participation, as well as Federal and State enforcement activity under the Clean Air Act 
(CAA).
5  We measure 33/50 effects at a 3-digit SIC industry level using rates of industry 
participation in the program. Specifically, for each year of the 33/50 program (1991-
1995),  we  measure  the  industry  participation  rate  (PR)  as  the  proportion  of  reported 
industry 33/50 emissions attributable to program participants in that year.
From  our  enforcement  data,  we  construct  three  measures  of  enforcement 
stringency: (1)  counts  of  Federal  and  State  enforcement  actions  (ACTIONS),  (2)  the 
numbers of facilities out of compliance with clean air laws (OUTCOMP), and (3) the 
numbers  of  reported  self-inspections  (SELFINSPECT).  We  use  these  enforcement 
variables  to  jointly  identify  emissions  and  participation  rates  (with  three  lags  due  to 
plausible lags in effects and because such lags avoid any potential for joint endogeneity).  
The Sierra Club provided us a panel of its state membership. To obtain a measure 
of  environmental  group  influence  on  each  industry,  we  obtain  the  weighted  average 
annual  Sierra  Club  membership  for  the  industry  (SIERRA),  weighting  each  state’s 
membership by the proportion of the industry’s regulated facilities operating in the state.
Financial  and  employment  data  was  obtained  from  the  Standard  and  Poor’s 
Compustat Dataset. Deflators are obtained using producer price indexes reported in the 
Economic Report of the President (2004). For controls, we include (deflated) industry 
sales  volume  (SALES)  in  order  to  account  for  potential  effects  of  industry  size  on 
patents; a measure of capital intensity (CAP-INT), namely, the level of new capital and 
equipment  expenditures  divided  by sales  volume;  the  industry’s  total  lagged level  of 
research and development expenditures per-unit-sales (R&D) in order to capture effects 
of overall industry research activity on environmental innovation; a measure of asset age 
(AGE), obtained by dividing total assets of an industry by its gross assets (as in Khanna 
and  Damon,  1999);  and  a  sales  growth  measure  (SALESGR).    To  measure  industry 
concentration, we construct a four-firm Herfindahl index (CONCENT) using annual sales 
datareported in Compustat. 
6
                                                
5 Because the 33/50 program primarily relates to air releases, we focus on enforcement activity under the 
CAA.
6 Initially, we also included an exogenous variable measuring each industry’s export intensity (ratio of 
exports to total sales).  However, as this variable was not statistically significant in any estimated equation 10
Merging all of our datasets fives us 127 industries for the 1989-2002 period for a 
total of 1778 observations over the 14 year period. If we incorporate two year lags in 
emissions, we have an unbalanced panel of 127 industries over 1991-2002 for a total of 
1397 observations.  Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
Our measure of innovation takes a count form with a relatively large number of 
zero’s and a mean count of approximately 20.  As noted above, we also have endogeneity 
issues with respect to both emissions and participation rates.  With regard to emissions, 
we  measure  the  “true  regressor,”  Et-1(Qt),  using  actual  emissions.    Due to  both  joint 
endogeneity  and  measurement  error,  we  instrument  in  order  to  avoid  bias  and 
inconsistency.  Due to  serial correlation in our emissions data, endogeneity bias also 
attaches to our lagged emission regressor; hence, we also instrument this variable using 
appropriately lagged exogenous data.
To  estimate  our  count  panel  model  with  endogenous  regressors,  we  follow 
Windmeijer  and  Silva  (1997)  and  estimate  a  Poisson  fixed  effects  structure  by  the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  Testing for fixed time effects, we find none of 
significance and hence estimate without.
Effects of 33/50 participation on patent applications occur at least with the lag 
required for research to produce patentable outcomes (which we assume to be at least two 
years).  Indeed, these effects may potentially take several years to manifest themselves.  
We attempt to capture lag-specific effects of participation by constructing year-specific 
participation rate variables.  With a minimum of two-year lags in potential effects, we 
measure participation impacts in each of years 1993 (two years after the 33/50 program’s 
inception)  and  1997  by  constructing  year-specific  two-year-lagged  participation  rate 
variables.  For  years  1998-2002, we measure participation  impacts with  year-specific 
variables for the most recent (1995) participation rates.  These variables permit us to 
estimate year-specific participation effects (with variables PRt, t=1993,…2002).
7
                                                                                                                                                
(regardless of the model), and its inclusion compromised model performance, we do not include it in our 
reported model estimations.
7 To identify the year-specific participation variables, we construct year-specific counterparts to our lagged 
enforcement variables.11
VI. Empirical Estimation and Findings
To  judge  the  strength  of  our  identifying  (enforcement)  instruments,  we  first 
estimate relevant “first stage” models of emissions and participation rates (per standard 
practice, Bound, et al., 1995).  Because emissions are continuous, the relevant first-stage 
is a fixed effects linear panel estimation with all exogenous data, as reported in Table 2; 
as indicated, the three enforcement variables are highly correlated with emissions, with 
predicted signs.  In particular, enforcement actions and heightened regulatory scrutiny 
due  to  out-of-compliance  status  both  spur  emission  reductions;  conversely,  self-
inspections – by potentially preempting regulatory scrutiny – are associated with higher 
emissions.  
For our 33/50 participation rate data, the appropriate “first stage” procedure is 
complicated by the non-continuous and truncated nature of the data (with all rates in the 
unit interval and a number of zeros).  To account for this data structure, we perform a 
“first stage” Tobit estimation using the participation odds ratios (PR/(1-PR)) (which are 
truncated at zero and otherwise continuous on R
+).  Results are reported in Table 3.  As 
required,  the  enforcement  instruments  are  highly  correlated  with  our  participation 
variable (see, for example, the chi-square test statistic for the null of zero coefficients on 
our three enforcement variables).
Tables  4A-4C  report  estimations  of  our  perfect  foresight  model.    The  first 
estimation  includes  year-specific  participation  rate  effects.    The  second  groups 
participation rate effects  for the earlier post-program  years  (1993-1998)  and the later 
years  (1999-2002).    And  the  third  again  groups  participation  rate  effects;  however, 
because 33/50 participation may have effects on research with more than a two year lag, 
this third estimation uses three-year lags in participation rate data (rather than two) for the 
early post-program years (1994-1998).
Several results should be stressed.  First and foremost, in all models, we find 
significant negative long-run effects of 33/50 participation on successful environmental 
patents, broadly supporting Hypothesis 2.  In Table 4A, for example, we have statistically 
significant negative effects of 33/50 participation rates on successful patents in  years 
1994, 1996, 1999, 2000, and 2002.  With three-year participation lags (Table 4C), this 
conclusion  is  tempered  by  significant  positive  short-run  effects  of  participation  on 12
environmental innovation.  A possible explanation for differing short and long run effects 
is  that  participating  firms  are  diverting  resources  from  more  ambitious  longer  term 
environmental R&D projects to both monitoring/compliance efforts and less ambitious 
shorter-term R&D.    Both  of  the  latter  investments  promise  dividends  in  meeting the 
shorter-term objectives of the 33/50 program.
Second,  as  in  Carrion-Flores  and  Innes  (2005),  the  anticipation  of  tightened 
emission  standards  spurs  more  environmental  R&D  (with  significant  negative 
coefficients on TRI-REL.   Third, environmental innovation is positively associated with 
industry scale (SALES), research spillovers (R&D and NONENV-PAT), capital intensity 
(CAPINT), and older assets (with AGE measuring “newness” of assets), all as expected.  
Concentration (CONCENT) is found to decrease innovation, consistent with the view 
that concentrated industries recognize regulatory responses to improved technologies and 
circumscribe their R&D investments accordingly.  More rapidly growing industries are 
also found to be the source of less environmental innovation (with negative effects of the 
SALESGR variable), perhaps because they are already quite modern and hence lesser 
scope for technological improvement. 
Finally, we should also stress our test of instrument performance.  For all models, 
the implicit (Sargan) test of zero correlation between our identifying instruments and the 
equation error is not rejected at reasonable levels of significance.
Forthcoming are estimations of our rational expectations model.  
VII. Conclusions
Our tentative conclusion from this paper is that VPRs may potentially have costs 
that have not before been recognized or anticipated by scholars or policy-makers.  In 
particular, we find preliminary evidence that participation in the 33/50 program may have 
diverted resources away from longer-term environmental R&D investments, leading to 
longer-run reductions in our patent count measure of successful environmental research.  
This outcome requires further study to determine its robustness to different lags of 33/50 
program effects on patent outcomes and different models of expectations formation.  It 
also suggests the need for more work to determine any long-run effects  of VPRs on 13
ultimate  environmental  performance.
1    However,  if  these  results  withstand  further 
scrutiny  and  to  the  extent  that  environmental  R&D  is  considered  the  engine  of 
environmental  improvement,  this  paper  suggests  that  VPRs  may  potentially  have  an 
important  environmental  cost  that  may  or  may  not  outweigh  the  short-run  emission 
reduction benefits identified in prior work.  
                                                
1 Extant studies of 33/50 effects on emissions have focused only on years before the program ended (pre-
1996) and hence have not measured any long-run effects, potentially via research channels.14
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics















PR (1991-1995) 0.4212 0.347817
Table 4A
Environmental Patent Equation with Year-Specific 
Participation Effects 
                 coeff    rob se   t-ratio   p-value 
TRI-REL        -0.0081    0.0032   -2.5168    0.0118
TRI-REL_2      -0.0055    0.0042   -1.2912    0.1966
SIERRA          0.0010    0.0011    0.8775    0.3802
SALES           0.0108    0.0030    3.6442    0.0003
SALESGR        -1.7364    0.2593   -6.6964    0.0000
AGE            -8.1314    1.0830   -7.5084    0.0000
CAPINT          10.8309   1.5094    7.1757    0.0000
R&D             2.9258    0.3999    7.3164    0.0000
NONENV-PAT      0.0082    0.0006   13.9695    0.0000
CONCENT        -4.6847    1.1910   -3.9335    0.0001
PR1993         -2.2089    2.5743   -0.8581    0.3909
PR1994         -1.9601    0.8161   -2.4019    0.0163
PR1995          0.0754    0.2753    0.2739    0.7841
PR1996         -1.2520    0.7147   -1.7519    0.0798
PR1997         -0.0224    0.7417   -0.0301    0.9759
PR1998         -1.1398    0.7767   -1.4675    0.1422
PR1999         -1.8599    0.9577   -1.9421    0.0521
PR2002         -2.2563    1.2478   -1.8083    0.0706
PR2001         -4.5495    0.6676   -6.8151    0.0000
PR2002          0.1693    3.5286    0.0480    0.9617
SARGAN TEST STATISTIC (P VALUE):    8.3633    (0.7561) 
TESTS for SERIAL CORRELATION and P-VALUES 
M1             -0.9401    0.3472
M2             -2.0639    0.0390
The dependant variable is ENV-PAT.  The estimation is by GMM, Poisson fixed 
effects, following Windmeijer and Silva (1997).  Year specific PR variables 
have two-year lags for 1993-1997 and the most recent lag (1995 participation 
rates) for 1998-2002. A two-year lag in TRI-REL is denoted with “_2.” 
Statistically significant coefficients (at the 10 percent level) are denoted in 
bold.18
Table 4B
Environmental Patent Equation with Grouped Participation 
Effects 
                 coeff    rob se   t-ratio   p-value 
TRI-REL        -0.0074    0.0058   -1.2664    0.2054
TRI-REL_2      -0.0022    0.0019   -1.1602    0.2460
SIERRA         -0.0004    0.0006   -0.6686    0.5038
SALES           0.0028    0.0017    1.6207    0.1051
SALESGR        -0.9779    0.1001   -9.7705    0.0000
AGE             0.1902    0.6290    0.3023    0.7624
CAPINT          7.0412    0.6788   10.3735    0.0000
R&D             0.0512    0.2477    0.2066    0.8363
NONENV-PAT      0.0115    0.0003   33.5502    0.0000
CONCENT        -2.3049    1.0992   -2.0969    0.0360
PR1993-98      -0.8042    0.7034   -1.1433    0.2529
PR1999-02      -0.9610    0.1504   -6.3882    0.0000
SARGAN TEST STATISTIC (P VALUE):    24.8701   (0.1285) 
TESTS for SERIAL CORRELATION and P-VALUES
M1             -1.2935    0.1959
M2             -1.5370    0.1243
The dependant variable is ENV-PAT.  The grouped PR variables have two-year lags 
for 1993-1997 and a three-year lag for 1998 (to construct PR1993-98) and the 
most recent lag (1995 participation rates) for 1998-2002 (to construct PR1999-
02). Statistically significant coefficients (at the 10 percent level) are 
denoted in bold.19
Table 4C
Environmental Patent Equation with Grouped Participation 
Effects 
                 coeff    rob se   t-ratio   p-value 
TRI-REL        -0.0090    0.0009   -9.4501    0.0000
TRI-REL_2      -0.0067    0.0004  -16.5678    0.0000
SIERRA          0.0000    0.0005   -0.0932    0.9258
SALES           0.0093    0.0026    3.6185    0.0003
SALESGR        -0.5720    0.0499  -11.4608    0.0000
AGE            -0.5078    0.3433   -1.4790    0.1391
CAPINT          5.1906    0.4656   11.1475    0.0000
R&D             0.6653    0.1956    3.4009    0.0007
NONENV-PAT      0.0118    0.0003   39.9738    0.0000
CONCENT        -4.9717    1.0022   -4.9608    0.0000
PR1994-98       0.8001    0.2202    3.6343    0.0003
PR1999-02      -0.7374    0.3138   -2.3498    0.0188
SARGAN TEST STATISTIC (P VALUE):    23.2322   (0.1818) 
TESTS for SERIAL CORRELATION and P-VALUES 
M1             -0.5253    0.5994
M2             -1.2971    0.1946
The dependant variable is ENV-PAT.  The grouped PR variables have three-year 
lags for 1994-1998 (to construct PR1994-98) and the most recent lag (1995 
participation rates) for 1998-2002 (to construct PR1999-02). Statistically 
significant coefficients (at the 10 percent level) are denoted in bold.